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Abstract-A cooperative game engendered by a noncooperative n-person game (the master game) 
in which any subset of n players may form a coalition playing an antagonistic game against the residual 
players (the surrounding) that has a (Nash equilibrium) solution, is considered, along with another 
noncooperative game in which both a coalition and its surrounding try to maximize their gains that 
also possesses a Nash equilibrium solution. It is shown that if the master game is the one with 
constant sum, the sets of Nash equilibrium strategies in both above-mentioned noncooperative games 
(in which a coalition plays with (against) its surrounding) coincide. @ 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. 
All rights reserved. 
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Let I’ = (T, {S~)~ET, {K)M) b e an n-person game in which T = G C N, and any subset K c T 
can form a coalition with the utility function CiEK Hi(s), where Hi : Hz, Si -+ R’ is a utility 
function of player i, i E G defined on a set of all allowable strategies of the players [l]; this 
game is called the master game further in this article. 
As is well known [I], cooperative game theory studies, in particular, antagonistic games playing 
between each coalition K (among all possible coalitions) and its surrounding (i.e., the set of 
residual players T \ K considered as another coalition (a unified player)), and the best guaranteed 
result (gain) that the coalition K can attain in the antagonistic game against its surrounding is 
the value of the characteristic function of the master game attributed to the coalition K [l]. 
In studying cooperative games engendered by the master game in the above-mentioned manner, 
it is considered that a coalition K plays against the coalition T \ K as the best guaranteed result 
for the coalition K is sought. However, to play such an antagonistic game may not, generally, be 
the most reasonable behavior for the coalition T \ K, which may prefer, for instance, to maximize 
its cumulative utility (the function CiET,K Hi(s)), regardless of what intentions the coalition K 
may have once such a coalition (K) has been formed and then to analyze whether the maximal 
(in this sense) gain exceeds the gain that the coalition T \ K may attain by counteracting the 
coalition K in the framework of the above-mentioned antagonistic game. Thus, it seems expedient 
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to establish possible relations between gains that can be attained in both noncooperative games 
which the coalition T \ K may choose to play with the coalition K. 
One should notice, first, that the antagonistic game played between a coalition K and its 
surrounding, the coalition T \ K, may not have Nash equilibrium (saddle) points even when the 
both best guaranteed results, the maximin and minimax, can be attained by the coalition K 
and the coalition T \ K, respectively. For some classes of antagonistic games on unbounded 
polyhedral sets, verifiable necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium strategies 
(saddle points) were established by the author in [2], whereas for a class of master games, namely, 
for noncooperative n-person games with finite numbers of strategies for each player, the existence 
of Nash equilibrium mixed strategies (equilibrium points) was established by Nash [I]. 
In this article, the further presentation will be limited to the consideration of those master 
games with constant sum for which first of the above-mentioned antagonistic games, Game I, 
which is an antagonistic game between the coalitions K and T \ K with the payoff function 
CieK H&K~ VT\K)Y and the second noncooperative game, Game II, 
xHi(FKrVT\K) -+ max, 
iEK EKEIK 
iET\K 
which is a noncooperative game of two players (the coalition K and the coalition T \ K), have 
Nash equilibrium pure or mixed strategies (where mixed strategies are probabilistic measures 
over the sets IK = niEK Si and IT/K = niETiK Si, respectively). 
From the inequality 
it stems that 
c ( H, &r&K) 2 c H, (&&K) > 
iEK iEK 
where G7 r]&K) and (EE, $,K) are solutions (Nash equilibrium strategies) to Games I and II, 
respectively. 
However, it is not clear a priori what kind of relations may exist between the numbers 
and 
Let the master game be a noncooperative game with constant sum in games of the kind under 
consideration, let W be this sum so that 
I+’ = x Hi(s), t/SE r-p%, 
(ET iET 
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let K be a coalition of K players playing Games I and II with (against) the coalition T \ K 
of T\ K players, and let (S%,#+iK) ad (S;(,$-jK) b e solutions to Games I and II, respectively. . 
THEOREM. The pair (&, v$,\~) is a solution to Game I if and only if this pair is a solution to 
Game II. 
PROOF. 
NECESSITY. Let (&, T$,~) b e a solution to Game I. It means, in particular, that 
and 
Then. from 
iEK GT\K 
and 
w - c Hi (&h&K) = c Hi (&&,K) 7 
iEK iET\K 
one can conclude that 
c &(I~,vT\K)= W- CH~(&,VT\K) L: W- CHi (&,v&K) 
iET\K iEK iEK 
= C Hi (tR,$$K) , VVT\K E IT\K, 
icT\K 
so that 
which, along with 
means that (&, q& ) is a solution to Game II. 
SUFFICIENCY. Let now ([k, 7j;,K ) be a solution to Game II. It means, in particular, that 
so that 
and 
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so that 
From 
c H,(<KrvT\K) = w - c Hi(tKJT\Kj 
iET\K ZEK 
and 
it stems that 
2.Z 
< 
- 
22 
so that from 
inf sup 
EKErx VT\KEIT\K 
-c H&KJT\K) 
iEK 
one can conclude that 
W + inf sup 
EKeIK ?)T\KEIT\K 
-c ~&(<K,~T\K) 
iEK 
c Hi (%+K) 
= - sup inf c &(<K,VT\K), 
EKEIK W~KEIT\K iEK 
which, along with 
and the well-known inequality [l) 
sup inf c Hi(EK,‘VT\K) 5 llT,i:fT,K [E”,TK %gKHi(tK;nT\K)j 
EKEIK qT\KeIT\K (eK 
means that the pair ([1;(,~;,~) is a solution to Game I. 
The theorem is proved. 
COROLLARY. For any solution (&, q&K) to Game I and any solution (<;(, Q$,~) to Game 11, 
the equality 
c Hi (E;(r+K ) = c Hi(&T$\K) 
iET\K iET\K 
holds. 
REMARK. From the proof of the theorem, it is easy to see that the solvability of either game is 
equivalent to that of the other game. 
Thus, when the master game is the one with constant sum, the guaranteed gain in Game I 
and the equilibrium gain in Game II that are attained by the coalition T \ K coincide, whereas 
counteracting the coalition K by the coalition T \ K may, generally, not be the best strategy for 
the coalition T \ K [3] although such a scenario is the worst for the coalition K. 
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